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ABSTRACT
Discussions of financial risk often fail to distinguish between risks that are consciously borne and
those that are not. To understand the breeding conditions for financial crises the prime focus of
concern should not be simply on large risk-taking per se, but on the unintended, or unanticipated
accumulation of large risks by individuals, institutions or governments, often through the lack of
knowledge or understanding of the risks by stakeholders and overseers of those entities. This paper
analyses specific situations in which significant unanticipated and unintended financial risks are
accumulated. It focuses, in particular, on the implicit guarantees that governments extend to banks
and other financial institutions, which may result in the accumulation, often unconscious from the
viewpoint of the government, of unanticipated risks in the balance sheet of the public sector. The
paper also discusses how risk exposures can be measured, hedged and transferred through the use
of derivatives, swap contracts, and other contractual agreements with specific reference to emerging
markets.
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1.  Risk and transparency  
 
Well-functioning financial markets carry out many tasks: the transfer of value over time 
(borrowing-lending), across borders and industries, the facilitation of payments, the 
fragmentation of large-size investment projects. An important latent function of financial 
markets is to provide timely information: on the expectations of economic agents and on the 
value of the economy’s assets. 
But perhaps the foremost function financial markets perform is the transfer or allocation 
of risk among different actors: young people, for instance, tend to be better equipped in taking 
on risk than old people. Given a total amount of risk in the economy, financial markets and 
financial institutions contribute to its distribution among different actors in a way that better 
fits individual preferences or conditions. 
Financial markets, however, are often “incomplete”, in the sense that they provide only 
limited possibilities to shift risk across individuals. The role of swaps and other privately 
negotiated derivative instruments is to complete financial markets, thus increasing the ability 
of individuals, financial institutions, corporations and governments to manage risk. 
 
1.1  Risk and derivatives 
Consider, for example, an emerging market economy. The domestic financial market will 
typically allow very limited diversification of risks. In such a situation, diversification through 
international capital mobility is the obvious alternative. However, the transfer across borders of 
the ownership of real and financial assets is a rather inflexible way to achieve diversification, 
in the sense that it is costly to reverse. Often it also runs against political constraints. 
Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivative contracts provide an appealing alternative. Equity 
swaps, for instance, allow a country to diversify risk without shifting the ownership of assets. 
For example, a government could impose tight capital controls, limit foreign ownership of   2
domestic firms and still diversify the country’s exposure to domestic risk through equity swap 
contracts with foreigners that do not require the transfer of ownership of the underlying asset. 
The general point is that risk diversification through derivative instruments is more 
flexible than diversification through the transfer of assets. Interest rate swaps, for instance, one 
of the most common of these instruments, allow banks to service both their borrowers, who 
want fixed-interest rate, long-dated loans and their depositor lenders, who do not wish to be 
exposed to interest rate risk, without the bank taking interest rate exposure itself. Credit- 
default swaps allow a bank to swap credit risk vis-à-vis one borrower for credit risk vis-à-vis a 
different set of borrowers: the risk-return performance of the bank may thus be improved 
without negatively affecting its relationship with customers—as might happen if the bank were 
to sell the loans. We discuss these instruments further in Section 6 of this paper. 
A volatile economic environment increases the incentive to use derivatives to achieve a 
better allocation of risk in the economy. During the first half of 2002, as uncertainty in the 
world economy was increasing, the size of the OTC derivatives market (foreign exchange, 
interest rate, equity-linked and commodity contracts), increased by 15 percent, reaching 
$127,564 billion. Outstanding credit derivatives, a type of instruments, which did not exist up 
to the mid-nineties, increased 35 percent, reaching $1,600 billion. 
1 
As derivatives markets expand, however, so do the concerns regarding the possibility that 
the use of these instruments might increase the vulnerability of the financial system, rather than 
contribute to a better allocation of risks. These concerns were well summarized in a recent IMF 
paper: “OTC derivative contracts bind institutions together in an opaque network of credit 
exposure, the size and characteristics of which can change rapidly and, moreover, are arguably 
not fully understood with a high degree of accuracy even by market participants themselves. 
Risk assessments and management of exposures are seriously complicated by a lack of solid 
information and risk analyses about the riskiness of both their own positions and those of their 
                                                                
1 Data from the B.I.S. and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.   3
counter-parties. As a result this market is characterized by informational imperfections about 
current and potential future credit exposures and market-wide financial conditions.”
2 The 
collapse of Enron and the view that the company’s use of derivatives was a factor in its 
demise—a view by no means uncontroversial, as discussed in ISDA, 2002--only added to these 
concerns. 
Discussions of the role of derivatives and their risks, as well as discussions of financial 
risks in general, often fail to distinguish between different types of risk. To understand the 
breeding conditions for financial crises the prime source of concern is not risk per se, but the 
unintended, or unanticipated accumulation of risks by individuals, institutions or governments 
including the concealing of risks from stakeholders and overseers of those entities. 
To make this point, the paper analyses specific situations in which significant 
unanticipated and unintended financial risks are accumulated. Among the examples concerning 
the public sector are the explicit and implicit guarantees that governments extend to banks and 
other financial institutions. Such guarantees can be the source of unrecognised accumulation 
by governments of unanticipated risks and resulting liabilities in the balance sheet of the public 
sector.
3 
We shall analyze how the value of such guarantees changes with the change in the value 
of the economy’s assets, and what this implies for a government’s financial policy, and thus for 
the sustainability of the public debt. This analysis will naturally lead to a set of reflections on 
the correct evaluation of a country’s exposure to risk and on the design of prudential rules for 
banks and for their shareholders. It will also lead to a discussion of the way financial 




                                                                
2 Schinasi, Garry, J. et al. (2000, p. 50). The paper provides a thorough review of the problems associated 
with the use of derivative instruments. 
3 These unexpected outcomes of economic actions are specific instances of the more general concept of 
unanticipated consequences of social actions. See R. K. Merton (1936, 1989).   4
1.2  Transparency and accounting principles 
There are situations where the unintended, or unanticipated accumulation of risks may be 
a sheer consequence of inadequate accounting principles that conceal risk itself. An important 
example of the limitations of standard accounting principles in identifying and revealing large 
risk exposures is offered by the treatment of company pension funds—a topic we take up in the 
next section of the paper. 
The demise of Enron has attracted much attention on the lack of transparency of leverage 
and risk-taking by firms that move liabilities and risk exposures off their balance sheets by 
using complex special-purpose partnerships and derivatives. The same financial engineering 
tools that have served well in the efficient transfer of risks across otherwise incompatible 
institutional systems, may also be used to disguise large risks and value losses from even the 
most diligent of detectors.  
The danger of abuse, and thus a need that corporate managers, board members and other 
external overseers understand these instruments, has been rightly emphasized following the 
Enron events. Indeed, the boards of many firms are engaging outside risk specialists to search 
for what they call “Enronitis” among their subsidiaries and capital structures. However, this 
bright-light focus on modern financial technology can blind us to more fundamental issues 
surrounding the limitations of traditional accounting. One need look no further than to the 
familiar, plain-vanilla, “well-understood” defined-benefit corporate pension plan as an 
example of these limitations. Such plans present a far larger in magnitude and more wide-
spread off-balance sheet leverage, than any of the Enron transactions, and without reliance on 
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2.  Risk and (lack of) transparency in U. S. balance sheets: the economic  
        effects of the accounting treatment of defined-benefit pension plans 
 
 
A defined-benefit (DB) pension plan represents a secured claim by the plan’s beneficiaries 
against the company—typically a guarantee of a pension of up to two-thirds of final salary. 
The plan’s assets constitute collateral-like security for promised benefits. From an economic 
standpoint, this is equivalent to the company borrowing money to invest in assets. For this 
reason a company that does not wish to use the defined-benefit pension plan it sponsors to 
increase its asset risk and its leverage should invest 100 percent of the plan’s assets in highly 
rated, fixed-income, securities, the duration of which matches the duration of the plan’s 
liabilities. This however is not what most companies do.
4 
 
2.1  GAAP rules and companies’ exposure to risk via the pension plans they sponsor 
 
Generally accepted accounting principles in the United States  (GAAP, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, SFAS 87) direct public companies that sponsor a 
defined-benefit (DB) pension plan to report, in their balance sheet and income statement, only 
the net difference between the company’s pension assets and liabilities, as a corporate asset or 
liability. Thus what enters the company’s balance sheet is only the surplus (deficit), which is 
the difference between the value of the plan’s assets and its liabilities. For example, a plan with 
$65 billion in assets and $64 billion in pension liabilities would report a net amount of surplus 
of $1 billion, the same as a plan with $2.5 billion in assets and $1.5 billion in liabilities. The 
amount of risk a company accumulates in its balance sheet, via the exposure to its pension 
plan, thus is not immediately visible.  
Table 1 shows the balance sheet of a hypothetical company that sponsors a DB pension 
plan. The case shown in the table is that of a company whose plan is fully funded—that is, at 
current market prices assets and liabilities are matched. This of course would not be the case if, 




Balance sheet of a company sponsoring a defined-benefit pension plan 
(The case shown is that of a company whose plan is fully funded) 
      A s s e t s      L i a b i l i t i e s  
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      C a p i t a l    |   -  Equity 
        |  -  Debt 
        |     
     off-balance  sheet:   |    
                Pension Fund Assets: |   DB Plan Liabilities   
          -  Bonds   40   |  100 
      -     S t o c k s     6 0   |        
 
 
For example, if the pension plan’s assets are partly (for the typical U.S. plan around 60%) 
invested in stocks, then a simultaneous fall in both interest rates and stock prices—as might 
happen during a recession or in a financial crisis with a flight to quality—would increase the 
value of the plan’s liabilities—which rise as interest rates fall—and at the same time reduce the 
value of the assets held as collateral for those liabilities. The company’s economic balance 
sheet is thus exposed to the volatility of the plan’s assets and liabilities.
5 
The accounting treatment of a DB pension plan is thus little different from the treatment 
of an off-balance-sheet long-dated swap derivative contract in which the company receives the 
total return on an equity portfolio and pays a fixed rate of interest in return applied to a 
notional amount equal to pension liabilities.  
                                                                
4 For an extended discussion see Bodie, Mitsui and Tufano (2002). 
5 We believe that the correct way to compute the value of a plan’s liabilities is to use the yield on a long-
term default-free bond as the discount rate since in this case liabilities are valued using a discount rate that 
has the same risk and timing characteristics as the payments the plan will make. This belief, however, is 
not undisputed. When stock markets fall, some actuaries hold that the fall in asset prices does not matter 
for the solvency of a pension plan, because, as share prices decline, the dividend yield rises and the 
expected return on the market increases. Accordingly, as the assets decline, so does the actuarially 
measured values of the liabilities—assuming this is computed using the dividend yield, as discount rate.   7
Therefore, a standard U.S. corporate pension plan may produce the same leverage and 
potentially large risk, as would the use of an equivalent derivative contract, with neither 
directly reported on the balance sheet. 
 
2.2  Pension plans, income statements and bonuses 
 
GAAP rules allowing a company to account for the surplus income from its DB pension 
plan as operating income, can  obscure any assessment of the company’s performance. 
Consider, for example, a good-performing year, that is a year in which the return on the 
pension plan’s assets is particularly good and exceeds what would be required to match the 
increase in the plan’s liabilities. GAAP rules allow this excess return to be credited as a new 
intangible asset, called “prepaid benefit expense”. The opposite adjustment can be made in a 
bad year. 
The beneficiaries of excess return are not the plan’s beneficiaries, but the company’s 
shareholders who can draw on this intangible asset to top up the company’s net income. For 
example, in 2001 Verizon Communications Inc. reported a net income of $389 million, after 
taking losses for a variety of telecom investments. The “true” net income, however was a loss 
of $1.8 billion: The net income was turned positive by drawing on the excess return on the 
assets of the company’s pension plan. 
Milliman USA, a benefits consulting firm, reports that in 2001 the net income declared by 
50 large U.S. corporations included $54.4 billion of excess returns from pension funds’ assets. 
In fact, these assets lost $35.8 billion.
6 
Discretion on the part of companies in their treatment of the returns on pension fund 
assets, and thus lack of transparency, extends far beyond. Keeping to the Verizon example, if  
one looks more closely at the company pension plan, one finds that in 2001 the return on the 
plan’s assets was negative, and resulted in a reduction in the value of total assets amounting to 
                                                                
6 www.milliman.com   8
$3.1 billion. How then could the company claim an excess return and report it on its income 
statement?  
GAAP rules are based on the assumption that over time positive and negative returns on a 
pension plan’s assets will balance out. A company’s accounting is thus expected to understate 
both its plan’s losses in bad years and its plan’s gains in good years. In economic terms 
shareholders should benefit from the pension plan’s income with smaller contributions in good 
years, and pay more into the plan in bad years. This is not what always happens in accounting 
terms. Verizon’s 2001 income statement “assumes” that its pension plan had earned a return of 
9.25 percent and it reported income as if that assumption were true. Other companies made 
even more bold assumptions: IBM assumed a return of 10 percent, General Electric of 9.5 
percent. In Verizon’s case, the income associated with a return of 9.25 percent would have 
exceeded the amount required to balance the increase in the liabilities of the company’s 
pension plan: thus the origin of the “excess” return. 
The incentives to legally manipulate the return on a company pension plan are enhanced 
by the practice of including the income assumed to have been originated from the pension 
plan’s assets when computing management’s performance bonuses. 
However, when a plan slips into underfunded status—as might happen when the fall in 
asset prices and interest rates do not reverse and eventually must be recognized in the 
company’s accounts—a corporation’s equity may take a hit that can disproportionately exceed 
the year’s charge to the DB pension plan. This is because SFAS 87 requires a corporation 
whose plan falls into unfunded status to take two actions: 
.  charge to the balance sheet a minimum liability equal to the amount underfunded. Thus, 
for a pension plan for which the minimum liability is required, all losses of the plan for 
the year–including the full effect of higher liability measured at the new lower interest 
rates and asset losses in the weak markets—are immediately reflected as reductions in 
shareholder equity;   9
.  cancel any asset that had been created in the corporation’s balance sheet as a result of 
the accumulation of excess returns on the pension plan’s assets during the previous 
years. The charge for such cancellation is taken by shareholders’ equity. 
To illustrate, assume a plan was previously overfunded, generating a positive contribution 
(negative annual cost of the plan) to the income statement in prior years. These positive 
contributions appear as a prepaid pension cost, an asset item on the company’s balance sheet. 
Now assume that the plan is no longer overfunded due to investment losses and/or an increase 
in obligations. The consequence of the minimum liability calculation is that: 
.  the prepaid pension cost (an asset) must be eliminated, and 
.  an accrued pension cost (a liability) equal to the amount of underfunding must be 
carried on the balance sheet.  
The combined effect of these changes can be a significant adjustment to shareholder 
equity as illustrated in Table 2. Note that in this example, the company’s equity is reduced not 
merely by the $1,000,000,000  underfunding, but by the reversal of the entire previously 




Balance sheet effects of the minimum liability requirement in the case of unfunded DB plans  
(U.S. $ billion) 
 
      Initial      Adjustment  for     Final 
      Measurements    Minimum  Liability     Figures 
 
Accumulated  benefit  obligation     50         50 
A s s e t s         4 9           4 9  
 
Unfunded                 1           1 
 
Accrued/(Prepaid) pension expense     5       6          1 
 
 
Note: The U.S. $ 6 billion adjustment is treated as a direct reduction in shareholder equity. 
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2.3  The transfer of risks onto the government 
 
GAAP accounting principles thus conceal on a year-on-year basis a company’s true 
exposure to market volatility, which should include the substantial exposure acquired through 
the assets and liabilities of its pension plan. 
Full disclosure, on corporate balance sheets, of the composition of a pension plan’s assets 
(or, in the absence of it, continuous matching of the mark-to-market value of the plan’s assets 
with that of its liabilities) would reveal the true degree of the company’s leverage and risk. 
This is not something that is being considered in current proposals for an overhaul of GAAP 
rules.
7 
How widespread is the problem? For many of the largest 50 U.S. companies (see Table 3) 
DB plans account for the bulk of the company’s pension plan assets. The remaining pension 
assets are accounted for by defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k). These assets 
collectively can be a multiple of the company’s market capitalization. In December 2001 the 
pension assets of General Motors, the largest corporate pension plan in the United States with 
over $73 billion in defined-benefit plan assets, were 2.7 times the company’s stock market 
value. As inspection of Table 2 reveals, GM is certainly not alone in this position among U.S. 
corporations. Corporate pension assets in total represent a significant fraction of the overall 
market value of U.S. corporate equity, over one-fourth. Sixty percent, on average, of the assets 
of defined-benefit plans are invested in common stocks: the fraction has increased from about 
50 percent in the 1980’s.
8 
As long as the company is solvent, the risks and rewards of allocating the plan’s assets to 
equities are borne by shareholders, since the fund’s beneficiaries enjoy a defined benefit with 
no upside. However, if the company were to go into bankruptcy, the risks are transferred in 
part to the beneficiaries, and in part to the federal government through the Pension Benefit 
                                                                
7 For a proposal in this direction see Peter Hancock and Roberto Mendoza “Risk and Transparency in 
Pensions”, Financial Times, March 20, 2002, page 21. 
8 GM announced In January 2003 that its pension fund assets were unfunded by $19.3 bn, compared with 
$9.1 bn a year earlier (Financial Times, January 10, 2003, page 21.)    11
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), the government institution offering partial guarantee to the 
beneficiaries of the companies’ DB plans. Therefore, when a company invests the assets of its 
pension plan in common stock it is de-facto raising its leverage, and transferring, at least in 
part, the risk onto the plan’s beneficiaries and onto the government. 
Negative shocks to the corporate sector can thus be transferred, through company pension 
funds to the government. An example is shown in Table 4. We assume that the pension plan (a 
DB plan with government guarantee) is invested 50% in equity. A negative shock to the 
corporate sector reduces the value of its assets by 40 percent, causing a 30 percent fall in 
equity. The fraction of the pension plan’s assets invested in equity also falls by 30 percent. In a 
DB plan the liabilities are unaffected by the shock. Therefore the government’s financial 
exposure to the plan increases by a corresponding amount. 
The effects of the transfer of risk onto the government are apparent in the balance sheet of 
the PBGC for the year ended on September 30, 2002.
9 During this period the operating loss of 
the corporation amounted to $3.64 billion, an $11.37 billion net turnaround from a $7.73 
billion surplus a year earlier, the largest in the federal pension insurer's 28-year history. Of 
these losses, by far the largest fraction, $9.31 billion, is accounted for by the increase in 
“Claims for actual and probable pension plan terminations”, that is for the pension obligations 
transferred to the PBGC by company plans in default, plus the increase in the value of the 
guarantees extended. This loss arises because, under GAAP, the PBGC recognizes as a loss 
both actual and probable pension plan terminations. During fiscal year 2002, $5.91 billion of 
the $9.31 billion in losses were from "probables." Since the close of the 2002 fiscal year, the 
agency has assumed full responsibility for the pension plans of two companies-National Steel 
and Bethlehem Steel-that together accounted for $5.16 billion of the losses estimated as 
“probable” on September 30. Another key factor was the decline in interest rates, which 
increased the program's liabilities by $1.65 billion. 
                                                                
9 The balance sheet is available at www.pbgc.gov.   12
Table 3: Largest 50 U.S. Corporate Defined Benefit Pension Funds as of December 31, 2001 
 
Company Name 




U.S. Defined Benefit 
Pension Liabilities, 
(PBO as of 12/31/01),  
$ milliona 
Total Assets of 
Sponsor, 12/31/01  
$ million 
Market Value of 
Sponsor, 12/31/01 
 $ million 
1  GENERAL MOTORS CORP  73,662  86,333  323,969  26,997 
2  INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP  61,096  60,410  88,313  208,371 
3  FORD MOTOR CO  48,754  51,214  276,543  27,368 
4 VERIZON  COMMUNICATIONS  48,558  36,391  170,795  128,828 
5  GENERAL ELECTRIC CO  45,006  30,423  495,023  398,105 
6 LUCENT  TECHNOLOGIES  INC
b
 35,539  29,850  33,664  21,510 
7 BOEING  CO  33,810  32,693  48,343  30,945 
8  SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC  32,715  25,060  96,322  131,672 
9 DAIMLERCHRYSLER  AG  28,152  30,817  184,616  42,295 
10 BP  PLC  22,505  20,402  141,158  177,026 
11  ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM  21,852  19,343  66,926  105,075 
12  LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP  20,300  19,713  27,654  20,559 
13 AT&T  CORP  18,485  14,035  165,282  64,180 
14  DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS  17,923  18,769  40,319  44,197 
15 BELLSOUTH  CORP  16,617  11,928  52,046  71,606 
16 NORTHROP  GRUMMAN  CORP  13,889  12,404  20,886  11,211 
17  EXXON MOBIL CORP  12,170  19,419  143,174  268,833 
17  PHILIP MORRIS COS INC  11,720  12,222  84,968  99,343 
19 DOW  CHEMICAL  11,424  11,341  35,515  30,466 
20  QWEST COMMUNICATION INTL INC  11,121  9,625  73,781  23,526 
21  HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC  11,051  10,952  24,226  27,502 
22 CITIGROUP  INC  10,323  10,388  1,051,450  259,710 
23 RAYTHEON  CO  10,164  11,171  26,636  12,693 
24  UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP  10,025  12,354  26,969  30,282 
25  UNITED STATES STEEL CORP  8,583  7,358  8,337  1,608 
26 CATERPILLAR  INC  8,481  8,611  30,657  17,935 
27 ALCOA  INC  8,434  8,488  28,355  30,196 
28  DELTA AIR LINES INC  8,304  10,657  23,605  3,606 
29  BANK OF AMERICA CORP  8,264  8,135  621,764  99,041 
30 3M  CO  8,008  8,998  14,606  46,348 
31 EASTMAN  KODAK  CO  7,942  7,439  13,362  8,562 
32 TRW  INC  7,902  7,482  14,444  4,687 
33 UAL  CORP  7,575  10,095  25,197  736 
34 PG&E  CORP  7,175  6,087  35,862  7,451 
35 XEROX  CORP  7,040  7,606  27,689  7,502 
36 CONSOLIDATED  EDISON  INC  6,634  5,904  16,996  8,566 
37  INTL PAPER CO  6,502  6,419  37,158  19,447 
38  UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC  6,496  5,347  24,636  18,302 
39  GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP  6,107  5,162  11,069  16,070 
40  DEERE & CO  5,951  6,440  22,663  10,364 
41 CHEVRONTEXACO  CORP  5,947  7,028  77,572  95,640 
42 PFIZER  INC  5,648  6,956  39,153  250,526 
43 FEDEX  CORP
c
 5,510  6,227  13,812  15,467 
44 AMR  CORP/DE  5,482  7,422  32,841  3,445 
45 UNISYS  CORP  5,215  4,816  5,769  4,002 
46 SOUTHERN  CO
b
 5,109  3,760  29,824  17,341 
47  BETHLEHEM STEEL CORP.  4,753  6,495  4,244  59 
48  AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER  4,510  4,391  47,281  14,027 
49 TEXTRON  INC  4,480  3,908  16,052  5,853 
50 JOHNSON  &  JOHNSON  4,355  5,026  38,488  181,286 
          
 
Source:  Compustat, Adapted by Akiko M. Mitsui, Research Associate, Harvard Business School on December 1, 2002. 
 
aData in these columns were derived from 10-Ks which use FASB valuation guidelines. Liabilities are based on Projected Benefit Obligations (PBOs) 
and assets may be fair market or market-related values 
bPension valuation data as of 9/30/01 
cPension valuation data as of 5/31/01 
 





Risk transfer from the corporate sector to the government through DB company pension funds  
 
Corporate balance sheet 
Assets     Liabilities 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Corporate assets     160  |   Debt     90   (- 10) 




Assets     Liabilities 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Bonds         10  | Present value of Benefits 
      Corporate equity        7  |   20         
             ( - 3 )   |    
      Financial guarantee        3  |     
                        (+3)  |     
                 
 
Government balance sheet 
Assets     Liabilities 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       A   |         A  
              |    Guarantee to the pension plan   
        |         3  
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3.  Balance sheets and financial guarantees
10    
The pension-plan example shows how the government can become exposed to shocks that 
originate in the private sector. Financial guarantees can transfer risk across different sectors in 
the economy and also produce negative feedback loops that can trigger severe crises. In this 
section we develop this theme further, showing how the implicit guarantees governments 
extend to banks and other financial institutions result in the accumulation, often unconscious 
from the viewpoint of the government, of unanticipated risks in the balance sheet of the public 
sector. 
 
3.1  Loans and guarantees 
Any time a bank makes a loan, an implicit guarantee of that loan is involved. To see this, 
consider the following identity, which holds in both a functional and a valuation sense: 
 
Risky Loan + Loan Guarantee    ≡    Default-free Loan 
 
this can also be re-written as: 
 
Risky Loan   ≡    Default-free Loan – Loan Guarantee 
 
Lending by a bank thus consists of two functionally distinct activities: pure default-free 
lending and the bearing of default risk by the lender
11. This equivalence of course applies more 
generally to other forms of debt obligations, not only to bank loans. Whenever a lender makes 
a loan to anyone other than a default-free government, he is implicitly also selling a guarantee.  
                                                                
10 This section draws heavily on Merton and Bodie (1992) 
11 This identity strictly applies only if (a) the guarantee itself is default-free, and (b) it covers the entire 
loan. That is, the guarantor will not default on this obligation, and his obligation is to fully make up for any 
loss on promised payments. Some guarantees have deductibles, or require co-insurance with the debt 
holder. Tax treatments and other regulatory factors could also affect the identity. While such factors are 
important in analyzing specific situations, they are not essential in understanding the fundamental 
functional activity of lending as discussed in the text.   
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To see this point more clearly, it will perhaps be helpful to think of the lending activity as 
taking place in two steps:  
i.  purchasing a guarantee, and 
ii.  taking up of a loan 
 
Suppose that the guarantor and the lender are two distinct entities. In the first step, the 
borrower buys a guarantee from the guarantor for, say, $10. In the second step, the borrower 
takes this guarantee to the lender and borrows $100 at a default-free interest rate of, say, 10% 
per year. The borrower winds up receiving a net amount of ($100 - $10 =) $90 in return for a 
promise to pay back $110 in a year. 
Often, of course, the lender and the guarantor are the same entity – for example, a 
commercial bank – and the borrower simply receives the net $90 from the bank in return for a 
promise to repay $110 in a year. The interest rate on the loan is then stated as 22.22%, i.e., 
($110 - $90)/$90. This promised rate reflects both the risk-free interest rate and the charge for 
the guarantee. To see that the two are separable activities, note that the holder of the risky debt 
could buy a third-party guarantee for $10, as shown in Table 5. The holder would then be 





The balance sheet of a bank that issues guaranteed debt 
(units are in $) 
 
Assets     Liabilities 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Risky asset  90  |  Guaranteed debt 100 
Guarantee   10   | 
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The purchase of any real-world loan is thus functionally equivalent to the purchase of a 
pure default-free loan and the simultaneous issue of a guarantee on that loan. In effect, the 
creditor simultaneously pays for the default-free loan and receives a “rebate” for the guarantee 
of that loan. The magnitude of the value of the guarantee relative to the value of the default-
free loan component varies considerably. A high-grade bond (rated AAA) is an almost default-
free loan with a very small guarantee component. A below-investment-grade or “junk” bond, 
on the other hand, typically has a large guarantee component. 
 
3.2  Transferring risk onto the government 
The liabilities that banks issue to fund their lending are often guaranteed by the 
government--typically through deposit-insurance schemes. Here we analyse the effects of these 
guarantees for the public sector. In particular, and more importantly, we wish to understand 
how does the  risk  exposure of the government change as the value of the banks’ assets 
changes? 
Table 6 shows the balance sheets for a corporation, for a bank that holds its debt, and for 
the government. The bank itself is financed in part with debt, in part with equity: the value of 
the debt, if its promised payments were risk-free, is $90. In panel A) there is no guarantee, 
therefore the debt is risky: its market value is $85, lower than its default-free value of 90. This 
is because, as in the example discussed above, it reflects the prospect of a lower-than-promised 
payment in the event of default. In panel A) the government is not involved in guaranteeing the 
bank: its balance sheet is balanced with assets and liabilities both equal to A. 
Next we examine, in panel B), what happens following a shock which reduces the capital 
of the corporation, and thus also the market value of the bank’s asset. The loss is absorbed in 
part by bondholders and in part by the bank’s shareholders—say a third by the former, and 
two-thirds by shareholders. The market value of the debt falls to $82 = $85 - $3; the bank’s 
equity to $8 = $15 - $7. The government’s balance sheet is again unaffected.    17
Now let us introduce a government guarantee that makes the bank’s debt risk-free. This is 
shown in panel C). Before the shock, when the capital of the corporation is worth $200, and the 
bank’s assets are worth $100, the value of the guarantee is $5, exactly the amount of the 
default discount on the non-guaranteed debt. Since the debt is fully guaranteed by the 
government, the value of shareholders’ equity does not change. In the balance sheet of the 
bank the guarantee is an “off-balance-sheet” item (this is why we write it “below the line”), but 
its value is fully reflected in the equity of the shareholders. Finally, the guarantee shows up in 
the government’s balance sheet as an additional liability: here too we write it below the line, to 
reflect that such guarantees are seldom accounted for in the government’s books.
12 
The guarantee protects the debt from the effects of the shock to the corporation’s balance 
sheet. This is shown in panel D). Equity falls to $8, as in the absence of the guarantee, while 
the market value of the debt does not move from its risk-free value, $90. This of course is 
possible because the value of the government’s guarantee has risen from $5 to $8, an increase 
that matches the loss that the debt would have incurred absent the guarantee. The government’s 
balance sheet now reflects the greater value of its guarantee to the banks. 
The government’s exposure to the guarantee changes, as the value of the underlying 
variables change. This is because the government guarantee protects the debt from the effects 
of any shock to the corporation’s balance sheet. In the last panel of Table 6, panel E), we 
examine by how much would the value of the guarantee rise, following a further shock to the 
capital of the corporation, one that reduces it to $120, a further loss of $40.  
The decline in the value of corporate assets increases the prospect of a default and a 
lower-than-promised payment to the bank: this reduces the value of the corporation’s debt to, 
say, $75. The value of the corporation’s equity thus falls to $45. Now consider the balance 
sheet of the bank. Absent the guarantee, the market value of the bank’s debt would have fallen, 
                                                                
12 In the United States, the Office of Management and Budget is supposed to estimate the value of all 
guarantees issued by the government.   18
say, to $73 and the bank’s equity to $2. The government’s guarantee protects the value of its 
liabilities: it thus amounts to $17.  
In our examples, the relative proportions in which a fall in the value of the bank’s assets is 
borne by debt and equity--or by equity and the government guarantee-- were simply given 
exogenously. Understanding the underlying structure and variables that determine the increase 
in the value of the guarantee, as the capital of the corporation falls, will assist our 
understanding of how governments, by guaranteeing the bank’s debt, can accumulate 
unanticipated risks--and why even recognizing the liability incurred at a given point in time on 
a marked-to-market basis is not enough to fully capture the government’s changing risk 
exposure.   19
Table 6 
Transferring risk onto the government 
(units are in $) 
 
 
A)    
Corporation 
Assets                     Liabilities 
Capital 200            | Loan 100 
                              | Equity 100 
 
Bank 
Assets                    Liabilities 
Loan 100              | Debt 85 
                             | Equity 15 
 
Government 
Assets                    Liabilities 





Assets                     Liabilities 
Capital 160            | Loan 90 
                              | Equity 70 
 
Bank 
Assets                    Liabilities 
Loan 90                | Debt 82 
                             | Equity 8 
 
Government 
Assets                    Liabilities 





Assets                     Liabilities 
Capital 200            | Loan 100 
                              | Equity 100 
 
Bank 
Assets                    Liabilities 
Loan 100              | Debt 90 
-------------------      | Equity 15 
Gov. Guar. 5        | 
 
Government 
Assets                    Liabilities 
A | A 
|--------------------- 





Assets                     Liabilities 
Capital 160            | Loan 90 
                              | Equity  70 
 
Bank 
Assets                    Liabilities 
Loan 90                | Debt 90 
-------------------      | Equity 8 
Gov. Guar. 8        | 
 
Government 
Assets                    Liabilities 
A | A 
|--------------------- 





Assets                     Liabilities 
Capital 120            | Loan 75 
                              | Equity 45 
 
Bank 
Assets                    Liabilities 
Loan 75                | Debt 90 
-------------------      | Equity 2 
Gov. Guar. 17      | 
 
Government 
Assets                    Liabilities 
 A | A 
|---------------------- 
   |   17 Bank Guar. 
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3.3  Using option theory to measure the exposure to risk 
Guarantees, like options, are contingent liabilities for their issuers, with required future 
payoffs contingent on the values of other assets. Indeed, the equivalence between a risk-free 
loan and the combination of a risky loan plus a guarantee suggests the analogy between a loan 
guarantee and a put option on that loan. The guarantee component of a risky loan is analogous 
to a put option that is a binding commitment to buy the loan for Vo, the promised value of the 
loan, in case the borrower, when the loan contract expires, is unable to repay—fully or 
partially.
13 
In the previous example the position of the holders of the corporation’s debt is analogous to a 
default-free debt combined with a short position in a put option on corporate assets. The 
economic balance sheet of the bank includes assets consisting of loans to the corporation, 
which can be decomposed into default-free debt as an asset and the put option as a liability. 
The bank also holds, among its assets, a government financial guarantee. The government, as 
the issuer of that guarantee, has it as a liability on its economic balance sheet.  
The three economic balance sheets can be used to demonstrate the interdependence 
among sectors. One is “long” on a certain implicit option; another is “short” on the same 
implicit option. These implicit options thus create important risk inter-linkages among different 
sectors. 
The analogy between guarantees and options suggests a simple way to measure the 
exposure to risk arising from a guarantee. For instance, if a government guarantees the 
liabilities of the banking system, how does its exposure change, as the value of corporate assets 
changes?  Option theory suggests a number of ways to measure exposure to risk. The most 
common one, “delta”, is the change in the value of an option as the value of the underlying 
asset changes. “Delta” is thus an appropriate measure of an institution’s exposure to risk. In 
our example “delta” could be used to measure to what extent the government’s exposure to its   21
guarantee changes, as the value of corporate assets, and thus of the assets of the banking 
system, change.
14 
To construct a measure of exposure to risk using option price theory, we start, in Figure 1, 
showing two relations. The piecewise linear line is the payoff, at the maturity date, for the 
holder of a guarantee (the option), as a function of the mark-to-market price of the underlying 
asset--the bank’s loan or the capital of the corporation in the particular case analyzed in the 
previous section. The payoff is positive for V < Vo, zero for V ≥  Vo. The other relation plotted 
in Figure 1 displays the value of the guarantee (the option), as a function of the mark-to-
market price of the underlying asset. This is inversely and non-linearly related to the price of 
the underlying stock.
15 
Figure 2 shows the government’s exposure to risk for any given value of the bank’s 
assets. The curve plotted in this figure is (the absolute value of) the tangent slope of the curve 
shown in Figure 2--that is of the value of the guarantee, for a date prior to the maturity of the 
asset. This curve (the “delta”) measures by how much the value of the guarantee changes as the 
value of the banks’ assets change. It shows that the government’s exposure, acquired through 
the guarantee, for certain ranges of values increases more than proportionately as the market 
value of the bank’s assets falls.  
The reference to the activities of investors is suggestive of how the government’s 
exposure changes as asset prices fluctuate. The additional liability transferred on the 
government’s balance sheet by a 10 percent shock to the capital of firms is larger the lower is 
                                                                
13 If the loan can default before maturity, the guarantee corresponds to an American option, where the 
exercise date is not predetermined. See Merton (1974, 1977). 
14 “Delta” is sometimes also called the “hedge ratio”. This is with reference to the activities of investors 
who “hedge” their position in put options by buying shares in the underlying stock. Because the price of 
the option rises as the value of the underlying asset falls, an investor who owns one put option, and wishes 
to hedge, must buy a number of shares that is larger the lower is the price of the stock. The “hedge ratio” 
increases as the value of the underlying asset falls. See e.g. Hull (2000), pp. 310-319. 
15 The figure is created using the option formulas developed in Black-Scholes (1973) and in Merton (1973) 
with the following parameter values: 
-  risk free rate = .04    -     volatility = .50 
-  time to maturity = 1 year  -     strike price = 105   22
that capital to start with. Recognizing this point about the non-linearity in the transmission of 
risk exposures is essential to prevent the accumulation of unanticipated risks on the 
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Figure 2 
 
GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO THE GUARANTEE (HEDGE RATIO) 












Market Value of Bank's Assets
Absolute Value of the "Hedge Ratio"
 
                 Source: Gray, Merton and Bodie (2002). 
 
3.4  The non-linear transmission of risk from corporate balance sheets to the government  
The framework described helps explain how volatility can be transferred in a non-linear 
way from the corporate and banking sectors onto the government. In the example risk is 
transferred through the guarantee. Following a negative shock to the corporate sector (for 
instance following a devaluation in the presence of unhedged foreign corporate debt), the value 
of corporate assets decline, and the value of the government guarantee to the banks increases in 
a non-linear way. This is also shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
   24
Figure 3 
"Market" Value of Corporate Debt and Cost of 
Government Guarantee to Banks as a Function of 































            Source: Gray, Merton and Bodie (2002). 
 
Figure 4 
Incremental Cost of Guarantee to Banks 
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              Source: Gray, Merton and Bodie (2002). 
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3.5  Financial guarantees and negative feedback loops  
Financial guarantees can produce negative feedback loops that can trigger severe crises. 
For instance, rating agencies may react to the information that the value of a government’s 
guarantees has increased by downgrading its sovereign bonds. The downgrade will raise the 
cost of servicing the public debt and lower the present discounted vale of future budget 
surpluses. This will lower the value of the government’s assets precisely when the value of its 
liabilities has increased. 
 
4.  Sovereign spreads, macroeconomic volatility and debt maturity
16  
Countries that issue large amounts of sovereign debt, especially, but not only, in emerging 
economies, often can only do so by issuing financial instruments with a very short duration. In 
Brazil, for instance, the duration of two thirds of the entire public debt is currently shorter than 
12 months. Thus, when the spreads such sovereigns must pay exceed a certain threshold level, 
the debt becomes unsustainable. We can think of this threshold level as the one beyond which 
the country can no longer continue to service its debt without default, or restructuring, or 
“unrealistically large” adjustments in fiscal variables or in the balance of payments. 
Applying options’ theory to the analysis of spreads offers a new way to evaluate the risk 
of default. As illustrated in Box 4.1, spreads depend on the average maturity of the debt, on the 
level of the risk-free interest rate, on the country’s leverage and on the volatility of its assets. 
These include, if the debt is denominated in foreign currency, the reserves of the central bank 
plus the (foreign currency value) of the government’s fiscal assets, that is the present value of 
residual fiscal surpluses and other assets.  
Consider, as an example, the effect of a shock that both lowers the value of a country’s 
assets and raises their volatility. This could happen, for instance, following a shock that lowers   26
the relative price of a commodity in which a country specialises, and  increases its volatility.
17 
As shown in Figure 5, the combination of a lower value of domestic assets and a higher 
volatility can produce a very large increase in spreads, due to the non-linearity in the relation 
between spreads and asset values. 
The relations shown in Figure 5 differ from the arithmetic commonly used to evaluate 
debt sustainability in two respects: 
1.  the standard sustainability calculation considers the value of a country’s assets—and 
how this changes, for instance following a devaluation--but fails to realize that changes 
in volatility also shifts default probabilities, and both affect bond spreads for a given 
value of a country’s assets; 
2.  the standard computations also fail to realize that the relation between spreads and 
underlying supporting asset values is non-linear and convex.
18 In contrast, the options-
based model provides a structural specification of the non-linear relation between the 
value of the guarantee and the asset values and their return volatilities. 
 
                                                                
16 The conceptual framework of the section was first presented in Dale Gray (2001,2002) and in Gray, 
Merton and Bodie (2002). 
17 Caballero (2003) discusses the effects such a shock in the context of Chile in the mid-1990’s, when a fall 
in the relative price of copper worsened the country’s terms of trade. 
18 For a rare recognition of this point in the literature of financial crises, see Fischer (2002).   27
Figure 5 
 
Sovereign spreads and asset volatility: 
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Source: Gray, Merton and Bodie (2002). 
 
The relation between volatility and sovereign spreads is perhaps suggested in the April 
2002 World Economic Outlook (IMF 2002, p. 66). The WEO reports various measures of 
macroeconomic volatility: the standard deviation of GDP, of government revenues and 
spending, of the terms of trade and the real exchange rate for different groups of countries. 
Along with these data it shows the frequency of debt-related events, defined as the number of 
defaults or rescheduling per country group in each period. The data shown in the WEO are 
reproduced in Table 7. During times of  relatively high macroeconomic volatility the frequency 
of debt events increases. Advanced countries show, on average, less volatility and no defaults. 
When volatility in advanced countries increased, as in the 1970s’ and ‘80s, compared with the 
1990’s, it had little effect on the number of defaults because advanced countries start from such   28
a high level of assets relative to their debt—which is consistent with the non-linear relation 
between sovereign assets and spreads shown in Figure 5.  
For the purpose of our discussion here, consider a simple model (we outline such a model 
in Box 4.2) in which future flows of payments to a country’s assets are proportional to GDP. If 
we posit further that flows to the assets are proportional to GDP, and expected future GDP is 
proportional to current GDP, then expected future cash flows would be proportional to current 
GDP. The volatility of a country’s assets will thus be proportional to the volatility of GDP, and 
spreads will on average be higher in countries in which GDP volatility is higher. The data 
shown by the WEO IMF hint at this relation, but fail to recognize the effect of the non-linearity 
in the relation between spreads and volatility. 
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Latin America  .44  3.8  3.2  13.4  33.6  6.6 
Emerging Asia  .25  2.9  1.8  8.5  14.1  5.2 
Advanced 
economies 
- 2.5  2.6  4.4  17.6  2.5 
 
1981-90 
         
Latin America  .89  4.9  3.8  16.5  27.4  39.2 
Emerging Asia  .13  2.9  2.0  10.3  7.7  24.8 
Advanced 
economies 
- 2.5  1.1  5.3  7.2  6.2 
 
1991-00 
         
Latin America  .33  3.7  2.2  7.9  8.7  18.0 
Emerging Asia  .25  4.1  1.8  8.3  5.9  8.7 
Advanced 
economies 
- 2.1  1.0  7.2  3.7  5.9 
 
(*) Number of defaults or reschedulings per country group 
Source: IMF (2002) p. 66.   30
 
Finally, note that a relation similar to that shown in Figure 5 holds for different values of 
the average duration of the debt, for a given level of asset volatility. In Figure 6, as the average 
duration of the debt falls from 1 year to 6 and to 3 months, spreads are higher for any given 
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Box 4.1:    Using option theory to compute sovereign spreads  
Consider a firm with risky assets V, which are financed by equity, S, and zero-coupon 
debt with face value F, maturing at T. Debt is risky: the risk is related to the probability that at   31
time T the value of the firm will be smaller than F and the expected recovery amount in the 
event of default. Thus, at time 0, the value of the firm’s debt,
rT Fe B
− < 0 , i.e. the promised 
yield to maturity on the debt is higher than the risk-free rate r. This defines the yield spread 
that compensates bondholders for the default risk they bear. 
To determine the value of this spread we shall consider, as above, the identity, in value, 
between the risk-free loan and the combination of a risky loan plus a guarantee. By purchasing 
a put option on V, with strike price F, the lenders could completely eliminate the default risk 
and convert the risky corporate loan into a risk-free loan with face value F. If the risk-free rate 
is r, then: 
 
rT Fe P B
− = + 0 0  
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19 See Merton (1994, 1997). For a recent book explaining these concepts applied to credit risk, see  
Crouhy, M., D. Galai and R. Mark (2001).   32
where σ  is the standard deviation of the return on the firm’s assets. As Crouhy et al. (2001,p. 
364) show, the formula has intuitive interpretation in the special case when there are no risk 
premiums on any asset--a so-called “risk-neutral” equilibrium world.
20 























we observe that the premium on the put option can be decomposed into two terms: 
.  the discounted expected recovery value of the loan, conditional on  F VT ≤ . This is the 
absolute value of the first term in parenthesis; 
.  the current value of a risk-free bond paying F at time T. This is the second term in 
parenthesis.  
Hence the sum of the two terms inside the brackets yields the (risk-neutral) expected 
shortfall, in present value terms, conditional on the firm being bankrupt at time T. The final 
factor is the (risk-neutral) probability of default, N(-d2). The product of the default probability 
times the expected shortfall determines the premium for insurance against default. 
The same expressions can be used to compute the default spread, that is, the difference 
between the yield to maturity on the risky loan, and the risk-free rate. This is: 





d N T rT − + − −  
                                                                
20 A key characteristic of the option-pricing methodology for pricing risky debt that makes it attractive to 
practitioners is that it does not require estimates of the expected returns on any assets.  Indeed, as a 
computational device, one can value options or risky debt “as if” there were no risk premiums. See Cox 
and Ross (1976).  Hence, the jargon term “risk-neutral” valuation is used to describe this pricing approach. 
Since the actual expected return of the firm’s underlying assets is never used in the pricing formula, the 
actual probability of default and the actual expected recovery rate are not deducible from bond prices or 
the formula. Only “risk-neutral” probabilities can be so deduced. If the assets of the firm have a positive 
risk-premium and thus an expected return greater than the risk-free rate, then the “risk-neutral” probability 
of default will give a biased-high estimate of the actual probability of default.   
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, of the volatility of the 
underlying assets, and of the maturity of the debt T. Note that, as volatility and leverage rise, 
the spread increases in a non-linear way—exactly as in the case of the guarantees discussed in 
the previous section.  
 
Box 4.2:  A fall in output can lead to a reduction in the value of a country’s sovereign 
assets. 
The ability to tax is typically a government’s most valuable asset.
21  Thus the sovereign 
assets of a country include, along with physical assets, the present discounted value of future 
budget surpluses (i.e. the governments’ taxing capability minus those government expenditures 
that will not be cut to accommodate foreign debt distress). We can therefore express the net 






o Net Assets A e E bs t B
∞
− =+ −   ∫  
 
where  0 A  represents the value, at time 0, of the physical assets controlled by the government 
and  0 B  the stock of public debt.  () tt bs t g τ =−  is the primary budget surplus, that is tax revenue 
minus essential government expenditure, net of interest payments, at time t, measured in constant 
dollars as of time 0, E0 is the expectation operator, conditional on information at time 0 and k is 
the real risk-adjusted discount rate, assumed to remain constant over time.  () bs t  is assumed 
proportional to the level of the country’s output at time t:  () . () bs t a y t = . If we further assume that 
shocks to GDP are persistent, that is dy ydt ydz ασ =+, the value of a country’s sovereign 
                                                                
21 Except where large amounts of the country’s assets are directly owned by the government, as for 
example in the Middle East.   34
net assets will be linearly related to its current level of output, 
()( ) 00 0/ A ay k B α +− − . 
The above equation assumes that the real cost of debt remains constant over time. 
Sovereign spreads, however, as discussed above, increase (non-linearly) when the value of 
sovereign assets falls. Thus the increase in sovereign spreads induced by a fall in output will be 
amplified, because lower output, for a given spread, reduces net sovereign assets, and lower net 
assets raise spreads and thus the cost of debt, which in turn reduces net sovereign assets. This 
is another instance of the negative feedback loops discussed in section 3.5. 
 
 
5.    Observations for the correct evaluation of a country’s exposure to risk and for the 
design of prudential rules for financial institutions and their shareholders 
 
As discussed at length in Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2002), explicit recognition of the 
chain of financial guarantees offers a rich framework for analyzing the risk exposure of a 
country. The main benefit comes from the ability to correctly assess dynamically the transfer 
of risk across sectors. Here are a few examples: 
.  distress in the corporate sector can be transmitted to the financial sector, e.g. following a 
change in commodity prices; 
.  distress in the financial sector can be transmitted to the government, e.g. through the 
government guarantee of bank deposits; 
.  sovereign distress or default can be transmitted to the private sector, e.g. through the 
increase in spreads. The same happens following a devaluation, which can raise firms’ 
leverage and unbalance the balance sheets of financial institutions to the extent that their 
liabilities are denominated in a foreign currency.   35
These issues of risk transmission across sectors were a focus of attention following the 
financial crises of the late 1990’s, whose characteristics did not fit the pattern of the traditional 
balance-of-payments crises of the previous decade. In this section we try our hand at relating 
our work to the recent literature on financial crises. The analysis of financial guarantees offers 
a rich tool for evaluating the extent of a country’s exposure to risk and how this changes over 
time. The importance of this issue is recognized in the traditional literature, but the analogy 
with the analysis of financial guarantees has not been made. This analogy provides a 
straightforward tool for analyzing how risk exposure builds up through the economy and 
eventually cumulates in the government’s exposure.  
We shall then draw, from the analysis of financial guarantees, some implications for risk 
monitoring. We shall do this having in mind offering some guidelines for  the design of 
prudential rules for financial institutions and their shareholders.  
In the next section we analyze how risk exposures can be controlled, hedged and 
transferred through the use of derivatives, swap contracts, and other contractual agreements.  
 
5.1  Balance sheets and financial crises 
 
Traditionally, international financial crises were characterized as predominantly current-
account crises. A country would run a large budget deficit, finance it by printing money, with 
the inflation tax. The currency would, more often than not, be fixed to the dollar—often 
because the resulting appreciation of the real exchange rate raises real wages. Eventually the 
trade deficit produced by the overvalued real exchange rate could no longer be financed: 
reserves dried up, and so did the supply of international loans. What followed were devaluation 
and a sharp cut in real wages, which in turn helped a recovery of economic activity. 
More recent crises, starting with Mexico in 1994-95, and then Asia and Russia in 1997-98 
are fundamentally different in that balance-sheet issues are central to the descriptions and 
almost surely to the propagation of the crisis, as vividly described in Dornbusch (1998):   36
 
”In Mexico’s massive earthquake, some years back, many of the splendid new buildings 
collapsed burying and killing a large number of people in the debris. Without the earthquake 
they surely would not have crashed, in fact they had graced the skyline for years, monuments 
to their proud owners and builders. But examination revealed that the concrete had far too 
much sand and too little of the real stuff. Not surprisingly, under stress they went. That surely 
was not an accident—the building codes were there, and the inspectors stood by collecting the 
payoffs for overlooking unsound construction. Just the same has been happening in cross 
border finance. Emerging market balance sheets stand up in fair weather but under stress they 
collapse. Vulnerability is the key word; risk is another way of looking at it.”  
 
The observation that the origin of many international financial crises lies in the 
accumulation of risk in balance sheets is central to the recent macroeconomic literature on such 
crises (for recent statements see Calvo, 2002 and Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2002). 
Understanding the effects of risk accumulation in balance sheets is important because it 
explains why, in crises of this type, monetary and fiscal policies tend to become ineffective. 
Banks with weak balance sheets do not react to an increase in central bank money by raising 
the supply of loans; and if government with a weak balance sheet attempts a fiscal expansion, 
spreads on government debt issues will go up, which often translate into higher spreads on 
private-sector borrowing as well. 
These observations also underscore Dornbusch’s recommendation that: “the right answer 
to crisis avoidance is controlling risk. The appropriate conceptual framework is value at risk 
(VAR)—a model-driven estimate of the maximum risk for a particular balance sheet situation 
over a specified horizon. There are surely genuine modelling issues with the specifics of VAR 
as has been widely discussed with respect to bank risk models used for meeting BIS 
requirements (cf. Crouhy et al, 2001). But just as surely  there is no issue whatsoever in 
recognizing that this general approach is the right one. If authorities everywhere enforced a 
culture of risk-oriented evaluation of balance sheets, extreme situations such as those of Asia 
in 1997 would disappear or, at the least, become a rare species.    37
This literature on international financial crises
22 recognizes that the implicit guarantees 
governments extend to banks and, through them, to firms create the potential for greatly 
weakening government balance sheets. The attention, however, has mostly focused on the 
reasons why such guarantees exist, rather on the correct measurement of their cost and 
changing risk exposures. One view (e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2001), emphasizes 
government bailouts, which encourage banks to willingly expose themselves to exchange rate 
risk: it is the government guarantee that makes it optimal for banks to have an unhedged 
currency mismatch between their assets and their liabilities, and thus transfer the exchange rate 
risk onto the government. Of course, the strength of that incentive is affected by whether 
current shareholders will lose their ownership in the event of failure or retain it. Subtler is the 
view exposed by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) who ask why private borrowers 
underinsure against country shocks and exchange rate depreciation by contracting foreign-
currency denominated debt. The answer they provide is that under-insurance is a feature of 
underdeveloped financial markets: if financial markets are well developed, firms have no 
incentive to take up excessive foreign-currency denominated debt.
23 
The contribution of our paper is in spirit responsive to the Dornbusch recommendation, in 
that it provides a framework for correctly evaluating the extent of a country’s exposure to risk 
and the changes in that exposure over time.  
 
 
5.2  Government exposure to the financial system: computing a country’s value-at-risk 
 
A country’s exposure to risk, at any given point in time, results from the risk exposure of 
each sector in the economy and from the transmission of risk across sectors through financial 
guarantees. Understanding how a sector’s exposure changes when events hit a different sector, 
and realizing that exposure to risk changes non-linearly, is the main benefit of the financial 
                                                                
22 For an introduction to this literature see Dornbusch (2002). For a review of recent contributions see 
Feldstein (2003). 
23 For a discussion of these alternative views, see Tirole (2002).   38
guarantees approach. The approach suggests a new way of thinking at macro risk: describe the 
economy as a set of interconnected portfolios of assets, liabilities and contingent claims and 
ask how the values of these portfolios react to external shocks (shocks to fundamentals). 
To correctly appreciate the extent of a government’s exposure to its financial system, 
three steps are involved: 
a)  the traded and non-traded assets of financial institutions, banks in particular, should be 
systematically marked to market: this is the first step to correctly evaluate the 
dimension of any existing guarantee; 
b)  the guarantees extended to financial institutions, whether explicit or implicit, should 
be openly recognized in the government’s balance sheet. Rather than precise rules for 
governments to consider adopting, we frame a general orientation towards helping 
markets appreciate the extent of the guarantees. 
c)  a government’s exposure to its domestic financial institutions—incurred through the 
outstanding guarantees to these institutions—explicit or implicit—increases more than 
proportionately with changes in  the weakness of the balance sheet of these 
institutions. The additional liability transferred on the government’s balance sheet by 
a 10 percent shock to the capital of firms is larger the lower is that capital to start 
with. If the balance sheets of corporations and financial institutions are weak when the 
economy is weak—as it is generally the case—then it is precisely when tax revenue is 
low, and the cost of debt service high because sovereign risk has increased, that the 
value of the guarantees will be particularly high. This observation offers a powerful 
argument for diversification of the government exposure to local shocks, for instance 
by swapping tax revenue—an issue we take up in next section of the paper. 
As noted in Merton (2002, p.66-67):  
“A prospective application of modern financial technology by government is the measurement 
and management of country risk….   39
A non-traditional approach to address the performance issue and its implication for 
evaluating policy is to apply the technology of a well-studied problem in risk and performance 
measurement for investment management and financial firms. This is the problem of 
configuring all the decomposition and reintegration of risk-factor exposures that must be 
determined within a financial institution before the aggregate risk measures such as value-at-
risk (VAR) can be applied. I believe that this technology, if properly adapted, can be used to 
measure country risk exposures  
. this is structurally the same problem faced in the risk measurement of non-traded assets 
and liabilities in financial institutions. In short, it is like the challenges of extending the VAR 
and stress-testing concepts to include the domain of non-traded assets and liabilities. But as 
with the application to financial institutions, I see this as a tough engineering problem, not one 
of new science … we know how to approach it in principle and what we need to model, but 
actually doing it is the challenge.  
As with conventional private-sector applications, the country risk exposures give us 
important information about the dynamics of future changes that cannot be inferred from the 
standard “country” accounting statements, either the country balance sheet or the country 
income or flow-of-funds statement.  
As we discover with more conventional applications of risk management systems, once we 
can measure the risk exposures we have, it is difficult to resist exploring whether we could 
improve economic efficiency and risk sharing by changing those exposures. 
With the developed countries, Japan and EMU Europe in particular, and the emerging 
ones both working on major changes in their financial systems, this may be an especially 
opportune time to explore country risk management.”  
 
Gray (2001 and 2002) has implemented this framework to build multi-sector economic-
value balance sheets of countries. Such balance sheets explicitly compute to what extent the 
values of financial guarantees change as assets and liabilities change and thereby provide ways 
to capture changing risk exposures as well as changing values (See also Gray, Merton and 
Bodie, 2002). This approach goes well beyond the simple recognition, pointed out in Blejer 
and Shumacher (2000), that the correct measure of a central bank’s exposure to risk should 
take into account the option value of any foreign-exchange derivative contracts the bank might 
have entered into.  
For instance, using data for Thailand at the end of 1996, Gray (2001) has estimated the 
value of the Thai government’s exposure through its implicit financial guarantees. At 33 Baht 
per 1 U.S. dollar (the December 1996 exchange rate was 25.6 Baht per dollar) the government 
exposure was short a put option whose value was less than 10 percent of GDP, provided equity 
prices remained unchanged and liquidity, measured by the willingness of lenders to roll-over or   40
refinance Thai USD loans, also remained unchanged. If equity prices declined 50 percent and 
liquidity were reduced, devaluation beyond 33 Baht per dollar would have raised the value of 
the implicit put option to 30-50 percent of GDP—a clear implication of the power of the non-
linearity in option values. By December 1997 in the crisis, the exchange rate reached 47 Baht 
per dollar and equities had lost 60 percent of their pre-crisis value. 
 
5.3   The valuation of banks’ assets 
 
Bank loans should be valued on a systematic and ongoing basis taking into account the 
borrowers’ ability to repay. There are several appropriate ways to do this, depending on 
circumstances. If the borrower issues debt, and the bonds are liquid, then use those marked-to-
market prices to value the loans. If its credit rating is known and frequently updated, so-called 
matrix pricing based on rating spreads can be applied. Financial market prices such as the 
underlying firms’ equity prices can also be used to provide up-to-date estimates of the value 
and risk sensitivities of the loans using models like the one developed in Merton (1974): For 
empirical tests of the model, see Kealhofer (2003) and for its real-world applications, see 
www.moodyskmv.com and http://www.creditgrades.com. The fact that these alternative 
methods often produce different valuations should not be a reason for inaction. 
Standard accounting rules for marking down book values are subject to considerable 
management discretion. It is interesting to note that the valuation method based on historical 
cost commonly used is the least effective precisely at times when investors and overseers need 
the assurance of realistic and current valuations. When uncertainty grows, investors want a 
system that reflects asset values in the changed market environment, not book-value valuation, 
which rarely produces a change in price. 
Even if the loans are appropriately marked to market, there is an issue on how to measure 
the future risk exposure. The amount of money that one can reasonably expect to lose as a   41
result of a default over a given period is a bank’s “expected risk exposure”. 
24 The expected 
loss will depend on (i) the amount exposed to credit risk; (ii) the probability of counter-party 
defaulting, (iii) the recovery rate. The problem of measuring potential credit losses lies in 
finding the best way of estimating these variables. With respect to (ii) and (iii) institutions 
should develop techniques to compute the default rate path and the recovery rate path, and 
distributions around these paths estimated by examining those distributions at specific points in 
time in the future. As for the recovery rate one could use the recovery rate distribution as 
derived from surveys of recovery rates of senior corporate bonds that have defaulted. This 
analysis produces estimates of future recovery rate distributions that vary as a function of time. 
Just like default rate distributions they do not typically follow a normal probability density 
function. Finally, the distribution estimates of (i) – (iii) are to be combined to produce an 
overall assessment of the expected risk exposure.
25 
As for derivative instruments, starting with 2001-Q1 the FASB (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board) requires most U.S. companies to adopt rule FAS 133 “Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities”. This means that derivatives or hedged 
positions, even those embedded in contracts, should be reported on the balance sheet using 
their fair value (marked-to-market). Prior to this ruling derivative financial instruments were 
not recorded on the balance sheet.
26 
                                                                
24 See e.g. Crouhy et al. (2001). p. 551 
25  A step in this direction is the CreditRisk + model developed by Credit Suisse Financial Products and 
described in Credit Suisse (1997).  Valuation of risky debt does not necessarily require estimates of those 
factors or a discount rate, as in Merton (1974). 
26 Rule FAS 133 is currently under review, see http://www.fasb.org/project/133. FAS rules in which fair value 
plays a prominent role for initial recognition or ongoing valuation are: 
FAS regulation number  Subject 
FAS 115  Valuing equity investments 
FAS 123  Stock-option accounting 
FAS 133  Hedging derivatives 
FAS 141  Business combinations 
FAS 142  Purchased intangibles 
FAS 143  Asset retirement obligations 
Interpretation 45 (affects  
FAS 5, 57, and 107)  Guarantees   42
5.4   Can equity and and/or subordinated debt substitute for risk monitoring?  
 
The previous analysis suggests that careful monitoring of all the items on and off the 
balance sheet is essential for proper risk management. How strong are the off-balance sheet 
guarantees in the face of an unexpected fall in the correctly computed value of the bank’s 
assets? Can equity be a substitute for risk monitoring? Shareholders may be reluctant to 
commit large quantities of equity capital because of the agency costs related to this strategy 
and because of its unfavourable taxation. Subordinated debt, provided it is really junior to the 
depositors’ claims, could be preferable to large equity commitments. However, its 
subordinated nature can be more apparent than real. In the United States, its economic 
subordination need not be followed strictly by courts within the context of Chapter 11 
proceedings. Therefore, neither equity capital nor subordinated debt is a substitute for careful 
risk monitoring of assets’ values. Just as important is the marking to market of the liabilities 
and more specifically the monitoring of the market prices of the bank’s equity and 




5.5   Hedging macro risks 
 
The approach to risk management discussed above has implications for the banking 
industry in emerging markets in which there is a high degree of macro risk and correlation 
amongst all assets’ values. In this context, a common sense rule of asset diversification would 
suggest that an emerging-market bank that invests part of its assets in domestic government 
bonds increases its exposure to local macro shocks: the value of government bonds will be low 
precisely when the value of the loan book is low. Therefore, in such economies, banks should 
hedge the exposure of their loan book more than they would normally do in the context of 
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advanced economies, for example investing in non-domestic assets—be they bonds or 
otherwise. 
This issue came up during the recent crisis in Turkey. Turkish banks, as most emerging 
market banks, own large fractions of the domestic public debt: the general macroeconomic 
crisis which depressed the value of the loan books also brought the Turkish government close 
to defaulting on its bonds. Also the value of other assets in the banks’ balance sheets and their 
own equity value collapsed, resulting in a credit crunch and a further fall in the loan book 
values. On the basis of our previous analysis one would conclude that lack of proper 
monitoring and of proper risk diversification amplified the crisis. Our guarantee-based 
approach to risk management would have suggested the need for additional equity capital for 
the banks to continue their operations. Certainly the private sector had no incentives to provide 
such equity, which eventually came in the form of a blanket government guarantee on all bank 
deposits. The actual value of this off-balance sheet equity was itself dependent on the IMF’s 
financing and on the government’s successful fiscal retrenchment effort. Some G7 countries 
had advocated default on all public debt, and therefore also on the government guarantee, as a 
way to relieve Turkey’s budget from the burden of interest payments. It is now clear that such 
a course of action, destroying both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet banks’ equity, 
would have caused a bank run and a worsening of the crisis. 
 
 
5.6   Foreign ownership of an emerging country’s banks 
We have just seen how in small emerging market economies especially the value of the 
government guarantee to the banking industry is highly negatively correlated with the value of 
the banks’ loan assets. When the bank’s assets decrease because of a macroeconomic shock, 
there is an increase in the government’s liability from the guarantee because the expected risk 
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exposure is now higher, unless the bank raises adequate additional capital. This requires 
prompt action by the government or by the shareholder.
28 Unfortunately, when a serious crisis 
erupts, a statement by the government that it will stand by its guarantee has less credibility, 
while shareholders lack the incentive to provide additional capital. Incidentally, the same 
shareholders of the bank may have less new investment capacity, having invested in other 
sectors of the same economy.  
Spain’s direct investment in Argentina provides an example. The “cultural proximity” 
between the two countries resulted in direct investments being cumulated. Some large Spanish 
banks directly owned Argentinean banks, while at the same time also owning (often indirectly 
through their shareholding in Spanish companies) Argentinean firms operating in the industrial 
and service sectors. When the country’s economy collapsed the value of those firms also 
collapsed. Spanish banks had anticipated this event by creating, on their balance sheet, loss 
reserves to be used to write off their investments both in the banks and in the industrial and 
service companies they owned—which in the event they did. Following these large write-offs 
they were either unwilling or unable to infuse additional equity capital in the Argentinean 
banks they owned, thus accelerating their demise and shifting upon the government the 
responsibility for guaranteeing the bank’s liabilities.
29 
It has rightly been suggested that especially governments in emerging markets perform 
risk audits of their assets and liabilities using VAR-like methods in their assessments. We 
recommend that they should also periodically reassess the value of the guarantee they are 
implicitly and explicitly giving to the banking system and measure the expected risk exposure. 
There would arise a strong case for prudential regulation requiring the banks operating in these 
countries to sell or to diversify their loans portfolios into other countries’ assets through 
securitizations, credit default swaps and credit derivatives. Furthermore, as Spain’s example 
                                                                
28 Such action, because of the non-linear relation between the price of the option and the value of the loan, 
must be of a bigger size than what is suggested by the static comparison of the two values in the new state.   45
shows, the foreign shareholders of the banks should comply with similar rules especially if 
they are banks themselves. 
 
5.7   Guarantees and governments’ financial policies 
A weakening of the domestic economy affects a government’s balance sheet in two ways. 
On the side of liabilities, the value of the implicit guarantee that the government provides to 
local banks increases—because, when the economy weakens, the value of the banks’ loans is 
likely to fall. The weakening of the economy is also associated with a fall in tax revenues: this 
in turn lowers the value of the government’s assets, as discussed in Box 4.2. 
30  The two effects 
interact, because the percentage increase in the liability transferred onto the government’s 
balance sheet caused by, say, a 10 percent decline in the capital of firms, and thus in the value 
of bank loans, is larger the smaller is that capital to start with.  
This analysis suggests four remarks: 
i.  Given the amount of short-term liabilities of the banking system in an emerging market 
country, given an estimate of the probability of default and of the recovery rate 
distributions (as discussed in Section 5.2 above), it should be possible to compute that 
level of the government’s assets that is necessary to provide a guarantee to those short 
term liabilities and how this should be adjusted following changes in the value of the 
loan book.  
As shown in Box 4.2, the PV of future available budget surpluses (i.e. the governments’ 
taxing capability minus those government expenditures that will not be cut to 
accommodate foreign debt distress) is an important, often the most important, asset 
                                                                
29 Most foreign banks, not only Spanish banks, simply wrote their investments off and  failed to invest 
additional capital when the crisis erupted. 
30 The fall in the government’s assets can be even bigger if, as discussed in Box 4.1, the initial fall in the 
value of assets raises spreads and thus the cost of debt service.  
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available to a government to support its debt. Therefore, the path of future fiscal 
variables should be adjusted whenever the value of the guarantees changes. This 
observation provides a rational for IMF plans which commit countries to a future path 
of primary surpluses. 
ii.  The greater is the short-term capital inflow and the consequent domestic credit 
expansion, the greater is the subsequent risk exposure and, therefore, the greater should 
be the collateral asset value of the government. Sizeable short-term capital inflows 
should thus be accompanied by the establishment of formal reserves in the accounting 
to reflect the higher liabilities. However, as already mentioned, in many countries the 
government’s most important asset is represented by the path of projected budget 
surpluses: therefore, short-term capital inflows should be accompanied by an increase 
in the path of projected budget surpluses, which would thus act as reserves. 
iii.  As we have seen in the case of Argentina, these governments should avoid currency 
mismatch between the base of their guarantee (the tax revenue) and the risk exposure. 
Therefore monetary arrangements like fixed exchange rates, and especially currency 
boards, when they are accompanied by a currency mismatch in the balance sheet of 
financial institutions are particularly vulnerable. 
iv.  Private-sector equity can hardly be expected to substitute for the guarantee provided by 
the domestic government. Private-sector equity is at most a cushion and can hardly be 
expected to perform the role of a guarantee. In the case of financial intermediaries, 
equity is a tiny fraction of total liabilities and its value is correlated with the value of 
the loan book. 
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This observation offers a powerful argument for diversification of the government 
exposure to local shocks, for instance by swapping tax revenue—an issue we take up in section 
6 of the paper. 
 
5.8   Observations on Basel II  
It has been argued (see e.g. Persaud, 2000, Borio et al., 2001 and Reisen, 2001) that Basel 
II will raise the volatility of private-sector capital flows to developing countries. Basel II 
retains from Basel I the fixed link between banks’ lending and equity, in the form of the fixed 
minimum capital requirement of 8 percent. Furthermore, risk weights are assessed on the basis 
of indicators that are pro-cyclical: under the “standardized approach” the external ratings, 
under the “internal ratings-based approach” the probability of default. It can be argued that 
both indicators behave pro-cyclically so that the borrowers’ risk category worsens and 
correspondingly their credit spreads widen in bad times, therefore increasing both the 
probability of further down-grades and of default. 
Such negative feedbacks, however, are not the result of regulation per se. If the reason 
why a country is downgraded (or its default probability, as assessed by the lenders under the 
“internal ratings-based approach”, is changed) is a real value problem, then the larger spreads 
simply reflect the increase in the amount of risk transferred onto the lenders, or onto the 
government that is providing the lenders with a guarantee. If instead the problem was just one 
of liquidity, then neither ratings need change, nor spreads increase. 
 
5.9   Capital controls 
Institutional environments in emerging market countries may make continuous risk 
management by governments, banks and banks’ shareholders, a rather complex task. More 
specifically, assessment of risk exposure and prompt response to its changes may be hampered   48
by lack of transparency and poor functioning of financial markets, so that governments can 
neither charge adequate risk-based premiums for their implicit or explicit guarantee, nor 
monitor properly risk exposure. In such a situation it may be tempting to conclude that the only 
alternative is restrictions on both the ownership of assets and the issue of liabilities—for 
instance to avoid the accumulation in banks’ balance sheets of currency mismatches that 
cannot be diversified away.  
Indeed, there are those who argue that some of the capital controls and of the distortions 
present in many emerging markets during the 1980’s, can be rationalized as responding to that 
motivation. The large variety of capital controls in the various countries makes it hard to draw 
any generalization. Indeed, restrictions on capital outflows were hampering in varying degrees 
just the kind of asset diversification that we have seen to be beneficial especially when there is 
concentrated country risk. However, by the same token, these restrictions were also applied to 
banks’ domestic liabilities, so that bank runs to shift assets outside the country were difficult, 
and governments could always use inflation to make good on their guarantee. In general, tight 
controls on capital outflows discouraged future capital inflows, serious currency mis-matches 
were rare, and most importantly governments were guaranteeing deposits that were 
denominated in the same currency as the domestic tax revenue base. That was not the case in 
Argentina, where ten years after financial deregulation the government was called to guarantee 
U.S.-dollar-equivalent bank deposits while the peso-denominated tax revenue base was 
shrinking and the exchange rate was depreciating. 
Emerging countries’ financial markets were certainly far from being efficient during the 
1980’s. Removing controls and asset restrictions were viewed by many as a fundamental step 
to promote growth and efficiency. But this well-intended action may have had the 
unanticipated and unintended consequence of reducing the intensity of monitoring of   49




6.  Managing risk to reduce financial fragility 
 
Many emerging countries have large concentrated exposures to specific industries—often 
the result of the domestic economy being relatively specialized. Table 8 provides one example. 
The data document Taiwan’s’ exposure to electronics, which is large both relative to the 




Taiwan: Export shares and sectorial shares in manufacturing value added (2000) 
 
 
Shares in manufacturing value added 
  electronics products and components      35.6 
 of  which 
- semiconductor  devices      15.0 
- communications equipment          7.2 
- computing and data processing equip.     30.2 
 
 
Shares of total exports 
  electronics        42.4 
======================================================================= 




Industrial policy to encourage the domestic development of other industries has 
traditionally been the way many countries have tried to diversify their risk exposure to specific 
sectors. The common policy instrument was public investment, often through state-owned 
enterprises. The sub-optimality of such policies is obvious, as investment is often directed 
towards sectors in which the country has no special comparative advantage. Furthermore, once 
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Merton (1936, 1989).]. It does not follow, however, that reinstitution of capital or asset controls is the 
answer.   50
the investments are made and considerable numbers of citizens are working in those newly 
created domestic industries, it becomes very difficult to reverse policy. 
Diversification through capital mobility is one obvious alternative. Financial markets 
allow a country to diversify its exposure to specific sectors, while exploiting its comparative 
advantage. Taiwan, for instance, could trade domestic stock ownership of its domestic 
electronics firms for a world-diversified portfolio of equities. Singapore, through the 
Government Investment Corporation and related funds, appears to have taken significant steps 
to diversify through foreign securities holdings. In general, however, this solution runs against 
at least three obstacles: it is inflexible (once done, deep foreign ownership of domestic shares 
is not easily reversed or changed); it creates incentive problems, as fear of expropriation of 
foreigner-held shares in domestic firms is always a possibility; it often runs against local 
political constraints such as the belief that the country’s “best” assets were sold to foreigners at 
too low a price.  
Swap contracts and other derivative instruments provide an appealing alternative. Swaps 
allow a country to diversify risk without shifting the ownership of assets. For example, a 
country could impose tight capital controls, limit foreign ownership of domestic firms and still 
reduce its exposure to risk: swap contracts do not require the transfer of ownership of the 
underlying asset. Risk diversification through derivative instruments is obviously more flexible 
than diversification through the transfer of assets.
32 
                                                                
32 Caballero and Panageas (2003) suggest that Chile could eliminate most, if not all, of its deep recessions 
by embedding into its external bonds a long put option, yielding US$ 6-8 billions when the price of copper 
falls by more than two standard deviations for a semester or more. They estimate that such insurance, if 
fairly priced, might cost US$ 500 millions (lump sum). Caballero (2003) argues, however, that currently 
“there is no natural market for holding such an instrument, and the corresponding derivatives markets 
would not suffice to cover the position of the writer of the option. “Even in the best emerging economies, 
he argues, aggregate risk management is being done with stone-age instruments and methods. “ He thus 
concludes suggesting that the IMF has a key role to play here in resolving this impasse and becoming a 
catalyst for such a development. He proposes that “the IMF creates a new Contingent-Markets Department 
which should have three primary tasks: (i) To help identify each country’s contractible contingent basis 
and develop the corresponding contingent bonds; (ii) To help create and regulate contingent market CDO-
like funds; (ii) To help design a macroeconomic policy framework consistent with the insurance 
mechanism developed for the country, and monitor its fulfillment.    51
The analysis of financial guarantees offers a rich framework for comparing alternative 
ways to control risk. In the remaining paragraphs of this section, we discuss how derivatives 
(swaps) can be used—and the extent to which they are used in practice—to limit the 
accumulation of risk and thus reduce a country’s financial fragility.  
 
 
Box 6.1:  Diversifying Taiwan’s exposure to electronics 
Consider Taiwan. Call RT the (stochastic) return on Taiwan’s GDP and RW
E  the 
(stochastic) world return on electronics. Since Taiwan is heavily exposed to electronics 
 
RT = a + b RW
E  + ε T 
 
where ε T is a country-specific component and b is larger the higher the exposure. Let RW
SM be 
the return on a well-diversified portfolio of world equities. Consider a swap agreement where 
Taiwan pays λ  RW
E and receives λ  RW
SM thus ending up with  
 
RT = a + (b - λ ) RW
E  + λ  RW
SM + ε T 
 
by choosing a value of λ  sufficiently close to b the country could reduce its exposure to 
electronics. For  λ  = b Taiwan would be left with the return on the well-diversified world 
equity portfolio plus an exposure to its idiosyncratic risk ε T.  
The swap as described is a “right-way” swap: in bad years, when electronics firms do 
worse than the world index of other industries, Taiwan is on the receiving end of the swap. It 
pays when world electronics outperform other industries. The country thus pays only in states 
of the world where the world industry sectors represented in local firms outperform the world 
index of other industries, i.e. when the country is relatively economically stronger.   52
Swaps can also be used to reduce the overall risk a country faces: Taiwan could hedge its 
exposure to risk by swapping (a fraction of) its exposure to RW
E for the world risk-free rate. 
Swapping the return on world electronics for the return on a well-diversified world equity 
portfolio, or for the risk-free rate, or for a mix of both, Taiwan would remain exposed to the 
idiosyncratic component of the returns of local firms, ε T. This may be the efficient thing to do 
from the point of view of local incentives, since ε T is the only component of the return of local 
firms on which the country has some control. 
In principle, Taiwan could also diversify away the exposure to idiosyncratic risk, by 
swapping the total return on its domestic portfolio of electronic companies (in effect both RW
E 
and ε T) for the return on the world diversified market portfolio. This limiting case would allow 
Taiwan to eliminate completely its exposure to local electronics firms, thus recreating the same 
conditions that would prevail if all domestic electronic firms were owned largely by foreign 
residents and Taiwan invested broadly around the globe. In this extreme case, however, as 
under too-large foreign ownership of domestic firms, the drawbacks are related to the incentive 
to expropriate, or the usual agency costs of a non-owner manager. 
 
 
6.2  Equity swaps as an instrument to diversify risk Internationally 
33 
 
In this section we illustrate how an equity swap could enable a small country to diversify 
risk internationally without violating possible restrictions on investing capital abroad. Suppose 
that small-country pension funds who already own the domestic equity were to enter into 
swaps with a global pension intermediary (GPI). In the swap, the total return per dollar on the 
small country’s stock market is exchanged annually for the total return per dollar on a market-
value weighted-average of the world stock markets. This exchange of returns could be in a 
common currency, dollars, as described or adjusted to different currencies along similar lines   53
to currency swaps. The magnitudes of the dollar exchanges are determined by the “notional” or 
principal amount of the swap to which per dollar return differences apply. 
Without pursuing the details of implementation, we see that the swap effectively transfers 
the risk of the small-country stock market to foreign investors and provides the domestic 
investors with the risk-return pattern of a well-diversified world portfolio. Since there are no 
initial payments between parties, there are no initial capital flows in or out of the country. 
Subsequent payments, which may be either inflows or outflows, involve only the difference 
between the returns on the two stock market indices, and no “principal” amount flow. 
For example, on a notional or principal amount of $1 billion, if, ex post, the world stock 
market earns 10 percent and the small-country market earns 12 percent, there is only a flow of 
(.12 - .10) x $1 billion or $20 million out of the country. Furthermore, the small-country 
investors make net payments out precisely when they can “best” afford it: namely, when their 
local market has outperformed the world markets. In those years in which the domestic market 
under-performs the world stock markets, the swap generates net cash flows into the country to 
its domestic investors. Hence, in our hypothetical example, if the small-country market earns 8 
percent and the world stock market earns 11 percent, then domestic investors receive (.11 - .08) 
x $1 billion = $30 million, a net cash inflow for the small country. Moreover, with this swap 
arrangement, trading and ownership of actual shares remain with domestic investors. 
Foreign investors also benefit from the swap by avoiding the costs of trading in individual 
securities in the local markets and by not having the problems of corporate control issues that 
arise when foreigners acquire large ownership positions in domestic companies. Unlike 
standard cash investments in equities or debt, the default or expropriation exposure of foreign 
investors is limited to the difference in returns instead of the total gross return plus principal (in 
our example, $20 million versus $1.12 billion). Default on the part of a counter-party in a swap 
                                                                
33 This section draws on Bodie and Merton (2002) and Merton (1990, 1999, 2002).   54
contract results in the flow of payments being interrupted: the other party loses the 
diversification the swap provided, which can be rebooked with a different counter-party. 
The potential exposure of foreign investors is probably less for the swap than for direct 
transactions in individual stocks. Not only because swaps only imply an exposure to flows of 
returns, rather than to the total value of the underlying asset. It is also more difficult to 
manipulate a broad market index than the price of a single stock. Even if settlement intervals 
for swaps are standardized at six months or one year, the calendar settlement dates will differ 
for each swap, depending upon the date of its initiation. Hence, with some swaps being settled 
every day, manipulators would have to keep the prices of shares permanently low to succeed. 
Furthermore, with the settlement terms of swaps based on the per-period rate of return, an 
artificially low price (and low rate of return) for settlement this year will induce an artificially 
high rate of return for settlement next year. Thus, gains from manipulation in the first period 
are given back in the second, unless the price can be kept low over the entire life of the swap. 
Since typical swap contract maturities range from two to ten years (with semi-annual or annual 
settlements), this would be difficult to achieve. 
The hypothetical equity swap just described enables pension funds to achieve broader 
international diversification. A different type of swap could enable them to hedge equity risk 
altogether. This would be particularly important for people in countries where there is no local 
entity, including the government, capable of issuing fixed-income securities that are free of all 
risk. 
This second type of swap would call for the pension fund to swap the total return on its 
equity portfolio for a risk-free interest rate denominated in a “strong” currency or in units of 
constant purchasing power. This hypothetical swap would work the same way as the one in the 
previous example, except that the net cash flows produced by the swap would result in the 
pension fund receiving a risk-free rate of return. The counter-party must have a very good   55
credit rating, or the swap must be guaranteed by a third party with a strong credit rating, or by 
a two-way mark-to-market collateral. As in the previous example, the pension fund would have 
to make payments to the swap counter-party only in years when its equity portfolio 
outperforms the risk-free rate. 
Swaps are over-the counter (OTC) instruments, traded outside organized exchanges. 
Trading swaps implies no capital requirements although mark-to-market collateralizing of 
swaps is wide-spread; there are no specific rules governing conduct, including risk 
management, imposing centralized trading, defining clearing and settlement rules, and loss-
sharing rules in case of defaults. OTC derivative markets lack a formal structure, have no 
physical central trading place, and no clearing or settlement system. There is also no central 
mechanism to limit individual or aggregate risk taking and risk management is completely 
decentralized.  
Swaps, however, are very different from traditional negotiated bilateral contracts. The size 
of the OTC derivatives market (about $100 trillion of notional contracts outstanding, see Table 
9) has meant that these contracts have become standardized, in particular with regard to the 
legal aspects of the contract and the procedure for enforcing them: ISDA provides standardized 
courts- and market-tested contracts. This makes a swap contract very different in cost and 
timeliness of execution from a one-off bilateral contract.  
The idea of using swaps to diversify risk has been around for a long time. What is 
different today, and allows swaps to be used in significant size and at low cost in practice, is 




Outstanding OTC derivatives by underlying instrument 
 
                   June 1998      June 2001 
Notional amounts outstanding 





.  Interest rate contracts      66.7    76.1   
.  Foreign exchange contracts    30.6    20.5 
.  Equity-linked contracts        1.9      2.0 
.  Credit linked          0.2      0.7 
 
 
Source: B.I.S., Triennial central bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives market 
activity in 2001. Basel, March 2002. 
 
 
Large macroeconomic risks can accumulate in the balance sheet of the government. 
Swaps can be used by governments to stabilize tax revenue and avoid the sudden accumulation 
of debt. Consider again a country like Taiwan exposed to a specific industry such as 
electronics. The accumulation of foreign debt denominated in foreign currency often occurs in 
states of the world where RW
E is low and tax revenue is correspondingly low. An instrument 
that allowed the government to reduce its exposure to a specific industry would stabilize tax 
revenue and reduce the sudden accumulation of foreign debt. As developed at length in Box 
6.2, there are other examples of instruments besides swaps performing similar functions 
including  structured notes and other collateralized instruments, which essentially allow a 
government to borrow against a future flow of income, e.g., the revenue from oil exports. 
 
 
Box 6.3  Other derivatives used to diversify a country’s risk 
 
Emerging market borrowers have increasingly used innovative financial instruments to 
maintain access to international capital markets and attract capital flows, particularly at times 
when financial market turbulence reduces investors’ appetite for emerging market debt. It is   57
interesting to note (see Schinasi et al., 2000) that the issuance of this type of securities was 
particularly large following the South-East Asian and Russian crises and died out as markets 
conditions returned to normal. One example is structured notes, a fixed income security linked 
to a derivative—usually a swap, but also options, futures/forwards, or even credit-linked 
derivatives. Structures notes, as already mentioned, allow a borrower to hedge almost any risk: 
they could be designed to link the payment to capacity of the borrower. The very flexibility of 
this instrument is often the reason for its lack of liquidity in secondary markets. Being tailor-
made for a specific country it is not surprising that a structured note is not a very liquid 
instrument. 
Collateralized bonds are not properly derivative instruments: they are really the 
securitization of future high-quality receivables, for instance oil revenue. In this sense they 
constitute senior debt, where the seniority is often guaranteed by incorporation of the issuing 
entity in a third country—as was the case with Pemex Finance, incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands, the entity used by the Mexican government to issue securitized notes. The entity is 
directly assigned the revenue from the receivables, which it uses to service the debt. As with 
the senior debt issued by some developing countries in the late nineteenth century, the problem 
with collateralized debt is that these instruments often earmark revenues, which constitute a 
major source of tax income. This automatically raises the cost of debt service on other forms of 
debt. 
Consider, returning to the example used at the beginning of this section, a Taiwanese bank 
that lends to local electronics firms. Taiwan’s comparative advantage lies in its firms’ ability to 
produce world-class electronics at low cost; the bank’s comparative advantage lies in its local 
knowledge, that is the ability to monitor the projects of local firms and their management. The 
domestic financial market, however, is too small to allow the bank to raise enough funds for its 
lending activities—the manifestation, at the individual bank level, of a macroeconomic 
phenomenon: the country needs portfolio capital investment to grow.   58
By borrowing in the international capital market the bank exposes itself to an array of 
risks. Not only the traditional maturity mis-match, and possibly also a currency risk, but 
exposure to an industry sector, world electronics, over which it has limited, if any, control. 
What the bank monitors is the relative performance of domestic firms, but a slump in the world 
electronics market weakens the bank, quite independently of its ability in lending and 
monitoring. The bank would need an instrument that allows it to diversify credit risk, e.g. to 
swap default risk vis-à-vis its domestic borrowers for credit risk vis-à-vis a set of international 
borrowers. This is precisely what a credit derivative contract can produce. 
A bank holding a concentrated loan portfolio has at least two ways to improve its risk-
return performance. First, it can actively manage the portfolio by trading loans: selling a loan, 
however, might negatively affect the bank’s relationship with its customer when this discovers 
that his loan has been transferred to a different institution. Second it can use credit derivatives. 
A credit derivative allows the bank to swap credit risk vis-à-vis one borrower for credit risk 
vis-à-vis a different set of borrowers. The two transactions are typically disjoint. First the bank 
enters a default swap arrangement, essentially an insurance contract through which the bank 
buys, for a fee, insurance for the event of a default. Next the bank sells insurance to other 
banks buying exposure to the default risk of a different loan. 
The transfer of credit risk can enhance the efficiency of credit markets by separating 
credit origination from credit-risk bearing. It can also help reduce the concentration of risk in 
banks’ balance sheets: not only allowing banks to diversify their credit exposure across 
markets and sectors, as discussed above, but also by making it easier to shift such risks onto 
the balance sheets of non-bank institutions.  
By there very nature, however, these derivatives spread credit risk to a broader set of 
market participants. This weakens the effectiveness of traditional credit-risk surveillance 
mechanisms—which are typically limited to banks—and increases the channels through which 
credit events can spread across institutions and markets.   59
There is also a concern related to the effectiveness of these instruments at transferring 
default risk in the case of credit events. Sometimes it has been unclear whether the 
restructuring of a company would qualify as a “credit event” and thus trigger the insurance 
clause.
34 Other cases were related to the purchase by banks of protection against the default of 
a client, triggered by his failure to make good on forward contracts for the delivery of a 
particular commodity—a form of credit default swap. The institutions selling such protection 
to the banks, often insurance companies, have argued that the banks never intended to take 
physical delivery of the commodity on the day the forward contract expired: the forward 
contract had been used by the bank simply to extend credit to its client—and the credit risk had 
been effectively transferred to the insurance companies: but this was not what the way the 




The Global credit derivatives market 
 
 
Net protection purchased by market participant 
(U.S. dollar bl.) 
 
Banks        200 
Corporations           80 
Securities  houses       -  10 
Hedge  funds       -  10 
Insurance  companies    -300 
 
Breakdown by instruments 
(per cent) 
 
Credit default products      42 % 
Total  return  swaps     11  % 
Credit  linked  notes     12  % 
Credit spread products       7 % 
Baskets        8  % 
Collateralized loan obligations    20 %  
===================================================================== 
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, March 2002, p.37-38. 
 
                                                                
34 On the legal enforceability of OTC derivative clauses see Schinasi at al. (2000) 
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7. Conclusions 
Discussions of the role of derivatives and their risks, as well as discussions of financial 
risks in general, often fail to distinguish between risks taken consciously and ones that are not. 
To understand the breeding conditions for financial crises the prime source of concern is not 
risk  per se, but the unintended, or unanticipated accumulation of risks by individuals, 
institutions or governments including the concealing of risks from stakeholders and overseers 
of those entities. 
This paper has analysed specific situations in which significant unanticipated and 
unintended financial risks can accumulate. We have focused, in particular, on the implicit 
guarantees that governments extend to banks and other financial institutions, and which may 
result in the accumulation, often unrecognized from the viewpoint of the government, of 
unanticipated risks in the balance sheet of the public sector. 
Using the structural analogy between guarantees and options we have shown that a 
government’s exposure to risk arising from a guarantee is non-linear. For instance, in the case 
of a government which guarantees the liabilities of the banking system, the additional liability 
transferred onto the government’s balance sheet by a 10 percent shock to the capital of firms is 
larger the lower is that capital to start with. Recognizing this non-linearity in the transmission 
of risk exposures is essential to reduce the accumulation of unanticipated risks on the 
government’s balance sheet. 
Analyses of recent international financial crises recognize that the implicit guarantees 
governments extend to banks and corporations create the potential to greatly weaken their 
balance sheets. The attention, however, has mostly focused on the reasons why such guarantees 
exist, rather than on measurement of the exposures they create. This paper offers just such a 
framework for measuring the extent of a government’s exposure to risk and how that exposure 
changes over time.   61
We have discussed valuation of the assets of the banking system; drawing on the work of 
Gray (2001 and 2002) we have analysed the issues to be addressed in order to compute a 
country’s value-at-risk; finally, we have used those insights to explain why the expected path 
of future fiscal variables (taxes and spending) should be adjusted whenever the value of the 
guarantees changes, such as, for instance, when the domestic economy weakens, or following 
an inflow of short-term capital. 
Finally we have discussed ideas on how risk exposures can be controlled, hedged and 
transferred through the use of derivatives, swap contracts, and other contractual agreements. In 
emerging-market economies the domestic financial market typically allows limited 
diversification of risks. Internal diversification through industrial policy can be inefficient and 
costly to reverse. In such a situation, diversification through international capital mobility is 
the obvious alternative. However, the transfer across borders of the ownership of real and 
financial assets is only one way to achieve diversification, and it too can be costly to 
implement and even more costly to reverse. Often implementing these approaches to 
diversification conflicts with political objectives and constraints. Over-the-Counter (OTC) 
derivative contracts provide an appealing, non-invasive alternative way to transfer risk. Equity 
swaps, executed on a large scale, allow a country to diversify risk without shifting the 
ownership of assets or otherwise disturbing the domestic financial practices. 
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